“More like a romance than anything of truth”:
Charles Edward Stuart and the Failure of the ’45

An academic paper by
Josephine Riesman
Age 17

Charles Edward Stuart has been canonized in Scottish nationalist folklore as "Bonnie Prince Charlie" for his leadership of an uprising of Scottish Highlanders against the Hanoverian King George II of England in 1745-6. The young and charismatic scion of the line of deposed Stuart kings met a great deal of initial success in his bid for the thrones of Scotland and England, leading many to assert that, were it not for cruel luck, he could have and should have achieved his mission. But the uprising was flawed from the beginning. English support for the Stuarts was ambiguous at best, the French were never more than tentative about fully backing Charles's coup, and the Highlanders were an anachronistic and unreliable fighting force. Charles's ignorance of these political and military realities, coupled with his own incompetence as a leader, ensured his failure in the uprising known as the “’45”

In early 1745, the young Charles felt that an anti-Hanoverian uprising had a "certainty of succeeding."i In 1744, at the invitation of King Louis XV of France, Charles had ventured to Paris from his family's court-in-exile in Rome. France was at war against England and had expressed its interest in a possible Stuart-led coup d'etat. To Charles, it was an opportunity to fulfill what he called the “great object” of his life.ii Since birth, he had been groomed for the single goal of recapturing Britain in the name of his aging father and thus claming his birthright as Prince of Wales. A mix of familial duty and youthful thirst for glory filled him with excitement. But from the beginning, the campaign was predicated on uncertainties. For one, French support turned out to be far from guaranteed. Upon arriving at the French court, Charles was surprised to find the king and his ministers tentative at best. Among their concerns were the cost of raising French troops to fight for the Stuarts, the potential failure of such a coup, and the further provocation of the English that the effort would bring.iii Simultaneously, Charles had begun to receive word that the Jacobitesiv of Scotland had broken earlier promises of unconditional support for a potential uprising and were now refusing to fight without massive foreign support. Although George II was unpopular, the strength of English Jacobite support was difficult to pin down, and no one in England had openly expressed support for the Young Pretender. Most importantly, Charles had never even seen Scotland, had no strategy for how to capture Britain, no ideology beyond a belief in the rightful Stuart ascendancy, and no prior experience in military leadership.v Even his father felt that the campaign was not ready.vi But Charles was of an impetuous and optimistic nature, and was “determined to come the following summer to Scotland, [even] with only a single footman.”vii In mid-1745, after a French victory over the English at Fontenoy and an unsubstantiated report that the Scots were willing to fight, Charles borrowed money, hired a contingent of mercenaries, enlisted the aid of two merchant ships, and sailed to Scotland.viii A British warship repelled the ship containing the soldiers and their armaments, but Charles would not be deterred. On July 23, he arrived on the shores of Eriskay in the Highlands of northwestern Scotland with only a small amount of borrowed money and a handful of advisers.

As locals came to the ship and chiefs of Jacobite clans sent emissaries to evaluate the young Prince, a complex and contradictory relationship began. There was much standing in the way of an effective Stuart-Highlander alliance. ix Highland Jacobitism came mostly out of a nationalistic desire for a Stuart-led unification of the various clans, with the aim of overturning the English subjugation of Scotland under the 1707 Act of Union. They had no desire to invade England. As a fighting force, the Highlanders were fierce, but lacked modern organization or technology.x In addition, although certain clans were historically Jacobite, an estimated two-thirds of all Highland Scots remained unaffiliated or passively loyal to the crown.xi The Jacobite chiefs realized that these problems, together with Charles's lack of troops, supplies, or experience, made any kind of uprising a potential massacre, and a number of them sent word to Charles to return to France. But the feudalistic chiefs knew that it was only a matter of time before Parliament would openly attack their almost totally sovereign local dominions, and they could not pass up an opportunity to preemptively defend themselves. xii The Jacobite clans had also developed an intricate and quasi-religious nationalistic iconography that prophesied the revitalizing power of the “ancestral Stuarts.” xiii Charles's charisma and drive roused the hopes of clansman and chief alike. As Charles raised his father's standard in Glenfinnian, Moidart, and Perth, he gave stirring impromptu speeches and made such statements to the chiefs as "you may join me, or stay at home and learn from the newspapers the fate of your prince."xiv Thus, ignoring the inherent problems of the alliance, Charles amassed 3,000 troops by September.xv The '45 had begun.

At the time, the most effective English and Hanoverian soldiers were fighting on the Continent, and the royal forces in Scotland under commander John Cope were weak, untrained, and underequipped.xvi Throughout the autumn, Charles's troops effortlessly captured Edinburgh, defeated the royal troops at Prestonpans, and seized the castle Carlisle. Charles was ecstatic, and wrote to his father that the campaign "already must appear to posterity more like a romance than anything of truth."xvii He was more right than he knew. These victories were deceptive. The Scots had needed only their enthusiasm to defeat the weak and demoralized royal troops, but the Highland fighting style remained disorganized and anachronistic.xviii The Highlanders’ enthusiasm was also based largely on Charles's "undoubted assurances" of French and English support, but although the French signed a treaty with James in October, concrete support remained elusive, and the rumored English Jacobites had yet to show themselves.xix Evidence of how divided and disorganized the clans were came in wasteful disputes over which clans would fight in the most honorable positions.xx Most importantly, these victories indicated nothing of strategy on Charles's part. He fought at none of the battles and left their planning to generals such as Lord George Murray.xxi In fact, Charles had no long-term strategy beyond wanting to capture London. If put under strain, he was bound to lose any semblance of control over the campaign.

This was precisely the situation that arose soon after the Jacobites entered England. As before, the forces met little to no military opposition, and quickly were able to reach the town of Derby, a few days north of London, on December 4. But the cracks in the foundation of the campaign were beginning to show. The various English communities had shown themselves to be ambivalent at best toward the Young Pretender, fearful and antagonistic at worst. English propaganda had spread the reputation of the forces as a group of cannibalistic savages, led by a papist.xxii Although there were pockets of strong anti-Hanover sentiment in a few towns such as Manchester, few were willing to join the battle.

Charles was genuinely shocked. Although he had never seen proof, he had expected the unpopularity of George II to manifest itself in true English support. On a number of occasions during the campaign, he had sent hopeful messages to a handful of English lords who had been rumored to hold Jacobite sympathy, stating that he "thought I could not do better than to enter England, where I have always been assured that I should meet with many friends, equally disposed to exert their loyalty to their native king, and to shake off a foreign yoke under which the nation has so long groaned." He received no replies to these calls for support. xxiii By some estimates, around 300 individual Englishmen may have wound up in the Jacobite ranks over the course of the campaign, but these numbers are difficult to substantiate. xxiv Professor Bruce Lenman has best depicted the nature of Charles’s coveted English Jacobite support: "The Pretender's agents, anxious to please their master and to spur on the laggard court of France, had a vested interest in exaggerating the strength of their party in England…[meanwhile, many English were] willing to flirt, verbally rather than in their hearts, with Jacobitism in order to express their spleen and frustration [towards George II]." xxv Charles had failed to realize that England was a relatively stable nation, and one in which the office of the king, even if occupied by a frustrating and unpatriotic German, was no longer important enough to motivate mass participation in a rebellion. English support was just another element of the campaign that Charles had trusted to fall into place without his having to plan it out.

In December, this lack of strategic planning was proving to be his downfall in other ways as well. Money was running out, and his troops were going hungry. Worst of all, the English government had finally responded to the Jacobite threat by granting control of the royal forces on English soil to the brutally effective Duke of Cumberland, who was amassing troops. On December 5, the worried clan chiefs called a war council. In it, they formally stated their demand for a retreat into Scotland to regroup. Charles was furious. In opposition, he cited the news that the French were planning a naval invasion of England, led by his brother, Henry.xxvi All the more reason, the chiefs argued, to consolidate Scottish power and leave England to be won by the French. Charles grudgingly accepted the retreat. This concession can be seen as a turning point in the '45, but in many ways it was an inevitability from the outset. Charles had always been a figurehead, keeping morale high and negotiating with the French, but he had never had the long-range vision or administrative skill to truly take control of the campaign. By December, the chiefs had already realized their aim of reclaiming Scotland, and were only willing to act as an invading army if victory seemed certain. As recent events had shown, Charles had no mandate for power in England, making any lasting hold on London impossible. The chiefs were bound to oppose Charles, and with the troops more subordinate to their lords than to the Stuart Prince, the goals of the chiefs were the goals of the campaign. Charles had no choice but to concede. Thus began the final stage of the '45.

Upon re-entering Scotland, the embittered Charles saw the results of his poor planning. He was the proclaimed leader of the entire nation of Scotland, but he was wholly unqualified for such a post and had largely spent his rule outside the country. He had no apparatus of national governance whatsoever. Thus he had lost his hold on virtually all the previously captured cities and the Scottish populace, especially the Lowlanders, had grown agitated and antipathetic.xxvii Charles handled his frustration with this situation with an ill-fated decision to “no longer either ask or accept advice,” from the chiefs and when word came that Cumberland was approaching, he placed himself in command.xxviii He had never planned a single battle before in his life, and against the pleas of Murray and others chose to meet the English on the unfavorable terrain of Culloden Moor.xxix Bickering between Charles and the chiefs prevented a successful surprise attack, and on April 16, the two armies faced each other head-on. By this time, Charles had become convinced that the Scots were going to turn him in to the English and surrender.xxx In a move that can be seen either as cowardly or as a pragmatic attempt to maintain the Stuart line, he escaped, leaving a number of Scots without orders to attack.xxxi But his presence would hardly have helped. The demoralized, disorganized, and ill-equipped Scots were massacred by the superior British troops. The '45 was over, and with it, the Highland way of life.

Charles and the '45 left an interesting legacy. After spending months avoiding the English in Scotland, Charles escaped to France and began a tragic and alcoholic existence that left him with only one child, who died soon after him in 1788.xxxii Despite the end of the Stuart line, Scottish nationalists spent the following decades developing the Stuart iconography and creating an idealized and romantic legend of their Bonnie Prince and his uprising. But it is important to remember that such stories have always had more to do with anti-English nationalism and the icon of the "Highland laddie" than the actual person of Charles. It is somewhat fitting that even the success of Charles's legend had little to do with his own abilities or efforts.

One can point to a number of factors for the failure of the ‘45. The Scots were ineffective against a modern army. The French were too worried about the cost of support to ever be firm in their promises. The English turned out to fear the Jacobites more than the Hanovers. But at the center of the '45's failure is Charles himself. Charles was not sadistic or avaricious. One can depict him as an impetuous and idealistic young man who defied improbable odds and was crushed by the forces of tyranny. But that is to miss the point. His impetuosity was, in reality, irresponsibility; his idealism, a deluded lack of planning. It would have been a difficult campaign for anyone, but Charles made the mistake of jumping into it without strategy, experience, concrete ideology, administrative capability, understanding of his allies, or mandate from the English he sought to rule. Dreams of a Stuart victory are and were only effervescent fantasy. The movement was doomed to failure.

***

BIBLIOGRAPHY:

Cruickshanks, Eveline. Political Untouchables: The Tories and the '45. New York City: Holmes & Meier, Inc., 1979.

Erickson, Carolly. Bonnie Prince Charlie. New York City: William Morrow and Co., 1989.

Fry, Peter, and Fiona S. Fry. The History of Scotland. New York City: Routledge, 1997.

Kybett, Susan M. Bonnie Prince Charlie. London: Unwin Hyman, 1988.

Lees-Milne, James. The Last Stuarts. New York City: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1983.

Lenman, Bruce. The Jacobite Risings in Britain, 1689-1746. London: Eyre Methuen, 1980.

Pittock, Murray. The Invention of Scotland: The Stuart Myth and the Scottish Identity, 1638 to the Present. New York City: Routledge, 1991.

i Carolly Erickson, Bonnie Prince Charlie (New York City: William Morrow & Co., 1989) 107.

ii Erickson 99.

iii Bruce Lenman, The Jacobite Risings in Britain, 1689-1746 (London: Eyre Methuen, 1980) 243. Lenman puts it this way: "[T]he natural deviousness of the bureaucratic mind when dealing with a potentially embarrassing issue remained a constant element in the French handling of the '45."

iv Those who supported Stuart claims to the throne. From the Latin Jacobus, meaning “James.”

v James Lees-Milne. The Last Stuarts (New York City: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1983) 58. His only firsthand look at war had been a brief participation in a battle for the Duke of Parma at age 14. Other than that, he simply had experience with riding and shooting on his family's property in Rome.

vi Erickson 97. James wrote to his son to warn him against "precipitate and dangerous measures [or] some rash or ill-conceived project, which would end in your ruin, and that of all those who would join with you in it." It is probable that such warnings only egged Charles on, because he both respected his father's dream for a Stuart restoration and also resented his introverted passivity. Much of Charles's brashness came out of rebellion against this trait.

vii Erickson 106.

viii The support of Irish Jacobite merchants operating out of France was crucial. Antoine Walsh, who arranged the transport, was partially funded by the French government, but also acted out of a mix of Jacobite loyalty and commercial calculation, since a Stuart government would end British naval attacks on smugglers.

ix Lenman 233, Fry 193. The greatest material encroachment on the Highlands had come with Parliament-directed construction of military roads throughout the Highlands in the 1720s. The greatest problems with taxation occurred in the less isolated Lowlands, where residents of Edinburgh and Glasgow had rioted against the Walpolean Malt Tax in the previous few decades. However, Lenman points out that the Highlanders' fear of taxation "hinged precisely on the fact that it was a centralized system run by a paid bureaucracy…[it was a manifestation] of an almost universal, and largely justified, suspicion of the central government."

x Susan Maclean Kybett, Bonnie Prince Charlie (London: Unwin Hyman, 1988) 118-9. The Highlanders' strength lay in vicious, disorganized combat based on fear and shock. They lacked anything resembling modern regimentation or discipline.

xi Lenman 255. Influential Highlanders such as Lord President Duncan Forbes, the chiefs of Macleod and Sleat, the Duke of Atholl, the Mackays, and the Sutherlands all refused to stir for Charles. He was never even able to raise a regiment in Edinburgh.

xii There is every reason to believe that the chieftains’ fear of encroachment was justified. Since 1707, the trend of centralization had resulted in the already-noted taxes and road-building, and the force with which the British government destroyed the Highland culture after the ’45 lends itself to the belief that Parliament could not tolerate an imperium in imperio. This was precisely what the Highlands were. The chiefs held almost total power over their clans, distributing land, wealth, and law in their rural communities. Their power was hereditary, and they presided over marriages, settled property disputes, and refused to deal with centralized government. They were, in many ways, the last vestiges of intense feudalism in Western Europe at the time.

xiii Murray G. H. Pittock, The Invention of Scotland: The Stuart Myth and the Scottish Identity, 1638 to the Present (New York City: Routledge, 1991) 41-72. The Stuart iconography is far too complex a topic to deal with here in full, but a few central elements should be mentioned. First, a tradition of Stuart hero-worship already existed by the time of the '45. The Highlanders had sung such songs as "Great James, come kiss me now" for decades. But with Charles, the tradition was reinvigorated. As Pittock puts it, "the Highland hero was conflated with the Stuart hero to present a picture of Charles Edward as the archetypal 'Highland Laddie,' … The defeat of the Union was seen as possible primarily through the restoration of a predominantly Celtic Scottish state, its fertility restored by a sacred chief, Charles, who was also its earthly lover." Second, the Stuarts were called upon in song to overthrow the commercialized, modernizing culture that was encroaching upon Highland life. But in songs like "Charlie is my darling," Charles himself became primarily a touchstone for Scottish nationalism, and his true personality mattered little.

xiv Erickson 117.

xv Peter and Fiona S. Fry, The History of Scotland (New York City: Routledge, 1997) 194.

xvi Lenman 249. Royal forces in Scotland amounted to less than 4,000 men, with only three and a half infantry regiments and not a single trained artilleryman.

xvii Erickson 182.

xviii Erickson 141, Kybett 140. The Scots were "unevenly and somewhat eccentrically armed" during the '45. Some had muskets or pistols, some had hunting weapons or broadswords, and many held simple bludgeons or went barehanded. A major in the army claimed that "not above one-half of the Highlanders was completely armed."

xix Eveline Cruickshanks, Political Untouchables: The Tories and the '45 (New York City: Holmes & Meier, Inc., 1979) 83, Erickson 149. As Charles wrote to his father on 15 October, "as matters stand, I should have one decisive stroke for it, but if the French [don't arrive], perhaps none."

xx Erickson 140.

xxi Kybett 151.

xxii Erickson 167. Pamphleteer Henry Fielding, later known for writing Tom Jones, was largely responsible for this war of words, distributing literature for the English government that warned of the "fury which rape, zeal, lust and wanton fierceness could inspire into the bloody hearts of Popish priestly bigots and barbarians."

xxiii Cruickshanks 87.

xxiv Cruickshanks 93. Cruickshanks has this to say: "Obviously the amount of sympathy there was in England cannot be known, how can one quantify views which cannot be expressed?"

xxv Lenman 237.

xxvi Kybett 165. This invasion never came to pass, largely due to more French stalling. At the time, they wanted to string the '45 out as long as possible, in order to divide the English forces, and thus avoided what they thought would bring about a quick end in an invasion.

xxvii Fry 194. Edinburgh remained "strangely sullen" whenever Charles was there.

xxviii Erickson 191.

xxix The ground was low and flat, giving the standardized maneuvers of the British a decided advantage.

xxx There is no evidence to substantiate such a plot.

xxxi Kybett 206.

xxxii Charles’s love affairs were complex and full of ambiguity over secret marriages and divorces, but for the purposes of this essay, only a few things need be known. He had an affair with and lived for some time with one Clementina Walkinshaw, who gave birth to Charles’s only child, Charlotte. Charlotte was illegitimate but had been legitimized by the Pope in 1783. When she died in 1789, she left three children by her husband, the Prince of Rohan, but despite her legitimization, her children were still technically ineligible to claim the Stuart throne. Although Charles’s brother, Henry Stuart, lived on for a number of years after Charles, he became a Cardinal in the Roman Catholic Church and thus never made any attempt to claim the throne.